Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets
By Michael Ostrovsky, M. Schwarz. 2010
166 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f78ba523d0f36f189ce96127fff5a914284f6ead
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In Economics and Econometrics
In Management Science and Operations Research
Citations in the corpus
- Information Design: A Unified Perspective (2019, unknown): “The economic applications of information design have been investigated in areas as far apart as grade disclosure and matching markets (Ostrovsky and Schwarz 2010), voter mobilization (Alonso and Câmara 2016), traffic routing (Das, Kamenica, and Mirka 2017), rating systems (Duffie, Dworczak, and Zhu…”
- The Simple Economics of Optimal Persuasion (2019, background): “For example, many schools release only coarse information on student performance (Ostrovsky and Schwarz 2010).”
- Bayesian Persuasion (2024, background): “Chicago, IL 60637 emir@uchicago.edu Matthew Gentzkow University of Chicago Graduate School of Business”