Signals: evolution, learning, and information
By Armin W. Schulz. 2012
389 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Genetics, Management Science and Operations Research, Sociology and Political Science
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Genetics
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Alex Peysakhovich
- Dorit Bar‐On
- Stephen Clark
- Marco Baroni
- Neil Shah
- Aaron C. Courville
- Karl Tuyls
- Angeliki Lazaridou
In Sociology and Political Science
- Alex Peysakhovich
- Neil Shah
- Dorit Bar‐On
- Marco Baroni
- Karl Tuyls
- Angeliki Lazaridou
- Srijan Kumar
- Adam Lerer
Citations in the corpus
- Multi-Agent Cooperation and the Emergence of (Natural) Language (2016, methodology): “We leverage ideas from work in linguistics, cognitive science and game theory on the emergence of language (Wagner et al., 2003; Skyrms, 2010; Crawford & Sobel, 1982; Crawford, 1998).”
- Multiagent cooperation and competition with deep reinforcement learning (2015, background): “A future direction of the present approach is to study of how communication codes [27, 28] and consensus [28–30] can emerge between interacting agents in complex environments without any a priori agreements, rules, or even high-level concepts of themselves and their environment.”
- Emergence of Linguistic Communication from Referential Games with Symbolic and Pixel Input (2018, background): “In classic signaling games, this polysemy phenomenon manifests itself as different states receiving the same signal and is termed partial pooling equilibrium (Skyrms, 2010).”
- Iterated learning for emergent systematicity in VQA (2021, background): “In these games, one agent must describe what it saw to another agent, which is tasked with figuring out what the first agent saw (Lewis, 2008; Skyrms, 2010; Steels & Loetzsch, 2012).”
- Origins of Meaning: Must We 'Go Gricean'? (2013, background): “…peacocks’ tail displays, birdsongs, dolphins’ ‘signature whistles’, and so on).17 In recent years, considerable progress has been made accounting for these sorts of signals using the theoretical apparatus of Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) (see Maynard Smith and Harper, 2003, and Skyrms, 2010).”
- False Information on Web and Social Media: A Survey (2018, background): “Thus, understanding the motives for disinformation are much akin to understanding the motives for deception [25, 93].”