Strategic behaviour under regulatory benchmarking
By Tooraj Jamasb, Paul H. L. Nillesen, Michael Pollitt. 2004
113 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f71ceeb7eebec986220cce14cc765f154a5a6a90
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Electrical and Electronic Engineering
- Michael Pollitt
- C. Kirkpatrick
- Yin-Fang Zhang
- David W. Parker
- Tooraj Jamasb
- Antti Saastamoinen
- Timo Sipiläinen
- Timo Kuosmanen
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Michael Pollitt
- Timo Sipiläinen
- Antti Saastamoinen
- Tooraj Jamasb
- Timo Kuosmanen
- David W. Parker
- C. Kirkpatrick
- Yin-Fang Zhang
Citations in the corpus
- What is the best practice for benchmark regulation of electricity distribution? Comparison of DEA, SFA and StoNED methods (2013, background): “This gives firms more room to ‘game’ the regulator by showing artificial improvement of efficiency (see e.g. Jamasb et al., 2003, 2004, for further discussion). setting.”
- Electricity sector reform in developing countries: an econometric assessment of the effects of privatization, competition and regulation (2008, methodology): “Instrumental variables have been used in the literature to correct for this potential bias, however, as Jamasb et al. (2004) point out, the major challenge is identifying appropriate instrumental variables and collecting data on them.”
- Incentive regulation of electricity distribution networks : Lessons of experience from Britain (2007, background): “…incentive regulation is to achieve these objectives 1 As such, the theory and empirical evidence on the merits of private ownership and privatization in the context of market-oriented infrastructure reforms can be characterized as inconclusive (Jamasb et al., 2004a; Mota, 2004; Zhang et al., 2002).”