Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion

By David Gilo, Yossi Moshe, Yossi Spiegel. 2006

317 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Passive partial ownership, sneaky takeovers, and merger control (2014, background): “9Similar results are obtained in the context of collusion, where PPOs have a stabilizing e ect (see, e.g., Malueg, 1992, and Gilo, Moshe, and Spiegel, 2006).”
Overlapping Ownership, R&D Spillovers, and Antitrust Policy (2019, unknown): “In the second case (cross-ownership, CO), we assume that each of the n (cid:133)rms may acquire their rivals(cid:146)stock in the form of investments with no control rights (e.g., nonvoting shares; see Gilo et al. 2006).”
The Network of Global Corporate Control (2011, background): “Indeed, mutual ownership relations among firms within the same sector can, in some cases, jeopardize market competition [13,14].”