Balance Sheet Adjustments in the 2008 Crisis

By Zhiguo He, I. Khang, Arvind Krishnamurthy. 2010

145 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f6de9a5e0d3565170aa0ae6abbbc659120dbb081

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Citations in the corpus

Bubbles, Financial Crises, and Systemic Risk (2012, unknown): “However, commercial banks seem to have a countercyclical leverage, according to He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010), potentially because they had access to the Fed’s lending facilities.”
The role of institutional investors in propagating the crisis of 2007-2008. (2012, unknown): “For example, He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) argue that banks were liquidity providers in the securitized bond market.”
A Crisis of Banks as Liquidity Providers: A Crisis of Banks as Liquidity Providers (2015, unknown): “These aggregate flow of funds match the data reported in He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) for the corresponding period (where core deposits are reported to have increased by roughly $800 billion while large-time deposits decreased by $200 billion).”
Leveraged Network-Based Financial Accelerator (2013, unknown): “…try to understand the leverage process both for ﬁrms and banks: Adrian and Shin (2008, 2009, 2010), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Flannery (1994), Fostel and Geana-koplos (2008), Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap and Shin (2008), He, Khang and Krishnamurthy (2010), Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2011).”
Measuring Liquidity Mismatch in the Banking Sector: Measuring Liquidity Mismatch in the Banking Sector (2017, background): “The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation guarantees whereby insurance limits were increased in the crisis provided a further guaranteed support of $336 billion as of March 2009 (He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010)).”
Intermediary Asset Pricing: New Evidence from Many Asset Classes (2017, unknown): “He et al. (2010) and Ang et al. (2011) describe one example that supports this view.”
Institutional Trading and Stock Resiliency: Evidence from the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis (2013, unknown): “He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) examine flow-offunds and SEC filings data and document large-scale selloffs of securitized assets by hedge funds and broker/ dealers.”
Convective Risk Flows in Commodity Futures Markets (2015, background): “2 Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino (2007), Froot (2008), Adrian and Shin (2010), and He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) provide evidence for capital constraints to affect liquidity and risk premium in various asset markets such as convertible bond market, catastrophe reinsurance market, and…”
Hedge Fund Stock Trading in the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 (2012, unknown): “…quarters of 2007, and by about 15% in each of the third and fourth quarters of 2008, on average.3 We also document an aggregate decline in short 2 He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) report that the aggregate value of assets owned by…”
Intermediary Asset Pricing (2013, unknown): “He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy ( 2010 ) also show that the commercial banking sector increased asset holdings over this period significantly.”
Fear of Fire Sales, Illiquidity Seeking, and Credit Freezes (2011, unknown): “More systematically, He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) show that over the period they examine, even while hedge funds and broker-dealers (typically investment banks) were reducing their holding of (illiquid) securitized assets by approximately $800 billion, insured commercial banks were…”