Feeling Is Perceiving: Core Affect and Conceptualization in the Experience of Emotion.
By Lisa Feldman Barrett. 2005
94 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f65a9c9028e8293b4e4a4eb4216b3cdde4cf85c4
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- Kristen A. Lindquist
- Lisa Feldman Barrett
- Hedy Kober
- Tor D. Wager
- Agnes Moors
- C. Izard
- Eliza Bliss-Moreau
- Jean Decety
Citations in the corpus
- The brain basis of emotion: A meta-analytic review (2012, background): “…cognition it is not necessary that brain activity be localized to specific areas across participants due to factors such as plasticity and the brain’s reorganizational capabilities in response to injury (e.g., H. C. Barrett 2005; H. C. Barrett & Kurzban 2006; Marshall 1984; Robertson & Murre 1999).”
- Theories of emotion causation: A review (2009, methodology): “The theories discussed are: (T1) James’ (1890) theory; (T2) Schachter’s (1964) theory; (T3) appraisal theories; (T4) network theories; (T5) affect program theory; (T6) Barrett’s (2006b) conceptual act theory; (T7) philosophical cognitivism; and (T8) philosophical perceptual theories.”
- Basic Emotions, Natural Kinds, Emotion Schemas, and a New Paradigm (2007, background): “(Spinoza, 1677/1957, pp. 31, 33) Some existing theoretical formulations maintain that all emotions are a function of conceptual acts on positive or negative core affect (J.A. Russell, 2003) and view emotions only as responses and as having no explanatory power (Barrett, 2005, 2006).”