Is finding security holes a good idea?
By Eric Rescorla. IEEE Security and Privacy, 2005
307 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Information Systems, Software
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f656cc510867895ea07ea3c0691c2e1009f6a305
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Information Systems
- Andreas Zeller
- Thomas Zimmermann
- Tyler W. Moore
- Christian Holler
- Benjamin I. P. Rubinstein
- Adam Barth
- Stephan Neuhaus
- Dawn Song
In Software
- Thomas Zimmermann
- Andreas Zeller
- Christian Holler
- Tyler W. Moore
- Dawn Song
- Ross J. Anderson
- Leyla Bilge
- Tudor Dumitras
Citations in the corpus
- Predicting vulnerable software components (2007, background): “Eric Rescorla argues that finding and patching security holes does not lead to an improvement in software quality [25].”
- A Learning-Based Approach to Reactive Security (2009, background): “Our use of a linear function re ects a level of abstraction more appropriate to a CISO who can never fully defend assets, which we justify by observing that the rate of vulnerability discovery in a particular piece of software is roughly constant [29].”
- Before we knew it: an empirical study of zero-day attacks in the real world (2012, background): “could not find the same strong evidence on a more limited data set [26].”
- The Economics of Information Security (2006, background): “bug makes little dierence to the likelihood of an attacker finding another one later [ 11 ].”