The relationship between cognitive penetration and predictive coding.

By Fiona Macpherson. 2017

48 citations recorded by the source corpus.

If beliefs and desires affect perception-at least in certain specified ways-then cognitive penetration occurs. Whether it occurs is a matter of controversy. Recently, some proponents of the predictive coding account of perception have claimed that the account entails that cognitive penetrations occurs. I argue that the relationship between the predictive coding account and cognitive penetration is dependent on both the specific form of the predictive coding account and the specific form of cognitive penetration. In so doing, I spell out different forms of each and the relationship that holds between them. Thus, mere acceptance of the predictive coding approach to perception does not determine whether one should think that cognitive penetration exists. Moreover, given that there are such different conceptions of both predictive coding and cognitive penetration, researchers should cease talking of either without making clear which form they refer to, if they aspire to make true generalisations.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Philosophy

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Cognitive Neuroscience

1. Yi-Chuan Chen
2. Charles Spence
3. Mirjam Keetels
4. Jean H. M. Vroomen

In Philosophy

1. Charles Spence
2. Yi-Chuan Chen

Citations in the corpus

• Assessing the Role of the ‘Unity Assumption’ on Multisensory Integration: A Review (2017, background): “Theories of predictive coding, nevertheless, do not necessarily consider the top–down modulations at the conscious level (see Macpherson, 2017).”