Intuitionism in the Philosophy of Mathematics: Introducing a Phenomenological Account

By Philipp Berghofer. 2020

50 citations recorded by the source corpus.

The aim of this paper is to establish a phenomenological mathematical intuitionism that is based on fundamental phenomenological-epistemological principles. According to this intuitionism, mathematical intuitions are sui generis mental states, namely experiences that exhibit a distinctive phenomenal character. The focus is on two questions: what does it mean to undergo a mathematical intuition and what role do mathematical intuitions play in mathematical reasoning? While I crucially draw on Husserlian principles and adopt ideas we find in phenomenologically minded mathematicians such as Hermann Weyl and Kurt Gödel, the overall objective is systematic in nature: to offer a plausible approach towards mathematics.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, History and Philosophy of Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f4e729b7fc215de2783484379be569dfedabe5aa