A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game

By Martin A. Nowak, Karl Sigmund. 1993

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Citations in the corpus

Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning in Sequential Social Dilemmas (2017, background): “logy. For example, there is a large and interesting literature concerned with mechanisms through which the socially preferred outcome of mutual cooperation can be stabilized, e.g., direct reciprocity [4, 5, 6, 7], indirect reciprocity [8], norm enforcement [9, 10], simple reinforcement learning vari”
Modelling Bounded Rationality in Organizations: Progress and Prospects† (2015, background): “…learning, experiential learning, operant or instrumental conditioning, “win-stay-lose-shift” rules in the relevant literatures in psychology, computer science, organization theory and evolutionary biology (Thorndike, 1911; March, 1991; Domjan, 2010; Nowak and Sigmund, 1993; Sutton and Barto, 1998).”
Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games (2012, background): “[11] Nowak MA, Sigmund K (1993) A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.”
Performance Bounded Reinforcement Learning in Strategic Interactions (2004, background): “This principle has been explored before under the title of Win Stay, Lose Shift (Posch & Brannath 1997; Nowak & Sigmund 1993).”
Evolutionary games on graphs (2006, methodology): “as w(sx → s¯x) = λΘ(a−Ux); P < a < R, (72) where a is the aspiration level, sx = C,D and ¯sx = D,C (the opposite of s), respectively. Pavlov is known to beat Tit-for-Tat in a noisy environment (Nowak and Sigmund, 1993). In the spatial versions the Pavlov rule was used by Fort and Viola (2005),”
On Adaptive Emergence of Trust Behavior in the Game of Stag Hunt (2002, unknown): “1999; Nowak and Sigmund 1993).”
Patterns of participation and free riding in territorial conflicts among ringtailed lemurs (Lemur catta) (2004, background): “…strategies developed in the context of the two-player iterated prisoner’s dilemma apply to lion cooperative territoriality (i.e., tit-for-tat and Pavlov; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Nowak and Sigmund 1993), but these strategies were insufficient to account for patterns of individual participation.”
Know when to walk away: contingent movement and the evolution of cooperation. (2004, methodology): “As Anatol Rappoport’s TFT strategy (Axelrod, 1984) and Nowak and Sigmund’s PAVLOV strategy (Nowak and Sigmund, 1993) illustrate, a simple strategy can outperform more complex strategies.”
Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations (2004, background): “In this case it can be shown that the ‘win-stay, lose-shift&rsquo”
A multi-agent reinforcement learning model of common-pool resource appropriation (2017, background): “(1) Unlike most game theory-based approaches where modelers typically “hand engineer” specific strategies like tit-for-tat [2] or win-stay-lose-shift [25], here agents must learn how to implement their strategic decisions.”