13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown

By Simon Johnson, James Kwak. 2010

281 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f44a546be9f54a281d5feacd967ba6a868ad0bba

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Arvind Subramanian
2. J. Kim
3. A. Baker
4. M. Kessler
5. Bruce Carruthers
6. Kevin L. Young
7. Dani Rodrik
8. Michael J. Hiscox

In Finance

1. Kevin L. Young
2. Arvind Subramanian
3. J. Kim
4. A. Baker
5. M. Kessler
6. Bruce Carruthers
7. E. Tsingou
8. Dani Rodrik

Citations in the corpus

• The New Political Economy of the Macroprudential Ideational Shift (2013, background): “…a qualitatively different form, in a fashion which should empower regulators and reduce the capacity of private actors to drive the regulatory debate in the fashion witnessed during the period in which the efficient markets position was ascendant (Johnson and Kwak 2010; Baker 2010; Tsingou 2008).”
• Fiscal Federalism: US History for Architects of Europe's Fiscal Union (2012, background): “For a lively contemporary treatment, see Johnson and Kwak (2010, 14–22).”
• The Sociology of Finance (2011, background): “One reason for the attention on finance is simple: By various measures, the financial sector of the U.S. economy has grown significantly in the past several decades ( Johnson & Kwak 2010, p. 59).”
• The Revolving Door and Worker Flows in Banking Regulation (2014, unknown): “Most of this work (for example, Johnson and Kwak 2010) is normative in nature but relies on case studies or other anecdotal evidence.”
• How Does Bank Competition Affect Systemic Stability (2012, unknown): “Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2013865 4 amply illustrated, large banks also can be more difficult to supervise given their complexity, and their ability to politically capture their supervisors (Johnson and Kwak, 2010).”
• The Financial Crisis of 2007–2009: Why Did It Happen and What Did We Learn? (2015, unknown): “Deregulation during the 1980s created large and powerful financial institutions with significant political clout to block future regulation, goes the argument presented by Johnson and Kwak (2010).”
• Transnational regulatory capture? An empirical examination of the transnational lobbying of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2012, background): “Many national-level studies also employ more detailed empirical research than is typically the case in their IPE equivalents (e.g. see Johnson and Kwak, 2010; Kroszner, 2001; Moran, 1986; Tett, 2009).”
• Financial Innovation: The Bright and the Dark Sides (2016, unknown): “Fourth, our paper is al o related to the literature on financial crisis, particularly the recent one (e.g. Love et al., 2007; Brunnermeier, 2009; Johnson and Kwak, 2010; Keys et al., 2010).”
• The Hyperglobalization of Trade and Its Future (2013, background): “Th e savings glut hypothesis is by no means uncontested; many economists argue that monetary and regulatory policies in borrowing countries should bear the brunt of responsibility (Johnson and Kwak 2010 and Haldane 2010).”