The Effect of SOX on Small Auditor Exits and Audit Quality

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Outsider Oversight: Designing a Third Party Audit Ecosystem for AI Governance (2022, background): “Another found that PCAOB inspections, which assess the compliance of registered public accounting firms with professional audit rules and standards, improved audit quality by prompting lower-quality auditors to exit the market [32].”
The Economics of Disclosure and Financial Reporting Regulation: Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research (2015, background): “DeFond and Lennox (2011) find that a large number of small audit firms exits the market for public company audits following SOX and that these auditors are of lower quality than those remaining in the market.”
Does PCAOB Inspection Access Improve Audit Quality? An Examination of Foreign Firms Listed in the United States (2016, result): “Unlike other studies on the PCAOB inspection program (e.g., Lennox and Pittman, 2010; DeFond, 2010; DeFond and Lennox, 2011), I use the”
Regulating Audit beyond the Crisis: A Critical Discussion of the EU Green Paper (2011, background): “…are legitimate doubts over the benefits of such reforms, it is beyond doubt that SOX has imposed significant additional costs to be an auditor for SEC-registered firms (DeFond and Lennox, 2011) and that these costs have been passed on to auditees (Ettredge et al., 2007; Ghosh and Pawlewicz, 2009).”