Multiple Large Shareholders and Corporate Risk Taking: Evidence from East Asia

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Multiple large shareholders, excess leverage and tunneling: evidence from an emerging market (2017, unknown): “For example, Laeven and Levine (2008), Maury and Pajuste (2005), Attig et al. (2013), Young et al. (2008), Guedhami and Misha (2009) and Mishra (2011) have documented that multiple large shareholders engage in efficient monitoring and can reduce the expropriation of private benefits.”
Multiple large shareholders and corporate investment: Evidence from China (2018, unknown): “…the cost of equity ﬁ nancing (Attig et al., 2008), enhance earnings informativeness (Boubaker and Sami, 2011) and increase corporate risk taking (Mishra, 2011) – all of which seem to indicate a mitigated agency problem and reduced information asymmetry between the controlling shareholder and…”
Ownership structure, control contestability, and corporate debt maturity (2015, background): “…previous studies on the governance role of MLS (Attig et al., 2008, 2009; Cai et al., 2015; Laeven and Levine, 2008; Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Mishra, 2011, among others), we consider different MLS-related variables to proxy for…”
Do Family Firms Use Dividend Policy as a Governance Mechanism? Evidence from the Euro Zone (2012, methodology): “This step also allows us to alleviate the omitted variable bias (Chi, 2005; Mishra, 2011).”