Systems Competition, Vertical Merger, and Foreclosure

By J. Church, Neil Gandal. 2000

130 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f3ce61d20d6fb58ac7a4beaee1c5e6c6137ca485

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Michael H. Riordan
2. Yongmin Chen
3. Alexander Mackay
4. Zach Y. Brown

In Strategy and Management

1. Michael H. Riordan
2. Yongmin Chen
3. Alexander Mackay
4. Zach Y. Brown

Citations in the corpus

• Vertical Mergers, Foreclosure and Raising Rivals' Costs - Experimental Evidence (2011, unknown): “However, neither way of colluding is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, as follows from backward induction, and both firms choosing 1 is the subgame perfect Nash prediction once again.(8) (8)One could, of course, solve for the minimum discount factor required for collusion as if”
• Vertical integration, exclusive dealing, and ex post cartelization (2007, background): “Ma (1997), Choi and Yi (2000), Church and Gandal (2000), and Chen (2001) consider richer models that feature trade-o¤s between anticompetitive e¤ects and e¢ ciencies.”