Electoral Connections: The Effects of the Personal Vote on Political Patronage, Bureaucracy and Legislation in Postwar Italy

By Miriam A. Golden. British Journal of Political Science, 2003

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The Politics of Effective Foreign Aid (2010, background): “…spend on programs that are more likely to reach larger segments of society (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) and promote growth (e.g., Stasavage 2005 and Hicken & Simmons 2008) and not simply result in inefficient patronage spending ( Jackson & Rosberg 1984; van de Walle 2001, 2003; Golden 2003).”
The Primary Effect: Preference Votes and Political Promotions (2016, background): “…Galasso and Nannicini (2011) examine how party organizations allocate political candidates across Italian districts and find that parties field 3 Golden (2003) makes a similar argument regarding the perverse incentives incorporated into Italy’s preference-voting reform, which allowed…”
The Empirics of Social Capital and Economic Development: A Critical Perspective (2005, background): “According to Golden (2003), politicians can maintain and reinforce linkages with their voters through the establishment of a complex system of political patronage.”
Proposal for a New Measure of Corruption, Illustrated with Italian Data (2005, methodology): “The XIth Legislature was the last under Italy’s old electoral system, one that systematically encouraged high-level political corruption (Golden and Chang, 2001; Golden, 2003).”
The effects of government ownership on bank lending (2004, unknown): “Southern politics in Italy is largely organized around the distribution of patronage (see Golden, 2001; Ginsborg, 1990).”