Truth, Effort, and the Legal Battle

By J. Hirshleifer, E. Osborne. 2001

127 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Restraining the Genuine Homo Economicus: Why the Economy Cannot be Divorced from its Governance (2003, unknown): “…assets in the face of weak legislation and enforcement have been rampant.12 Other activities that can be, at least partly, considered appropriative include litigation expenditures (Farmer and Pecorino, 1999, Hirshleifer and Osborne, 2001) and of course lobbying, ’corruption,’ and rent seeking.”
Persuasion as a contest (2008, methodology): “Obviously the inequalities in (15) and (16) are satised since”
Costly enforcement of property rights and the Coase theorem (2008, background): “When the two sides settle ex post under (26) and (27), with 2 eb > (e(1)r + e 1 f ) in equilibrium, the equilibrium payo¤s become:”
Contest functions : theoretical foundations and issues in estimation (2013, background): “This could be due to the awarder having a bias in favor of one opponent over the other or one of the contestants may have a natural advantage (such as the side arguing for the “truth” in a litigation trial as in Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001)).”