Abusing File Processing in Malware Detectors for Fun and Profit
By Suman Sekhar Jana, Vitaly Shmatikov. 2012
95 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications, Signal Processing
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Battista Biggio
- Fabio Roli
- Giorgio Giacinto
- Davide Maiorca
- Giorgio Fumera
- Nicolas Papernot
- Nicholas Carlini
- Pavel Laskov
In Computer Networks and Communications
- Battista Biggio
- Fabio Roli
- Giorgio Giacinto
- Davide Maiorca
- Giorgio Fumera
- Pavel Laskov
- Igino Corona
- Nedim Srndic
In Signal Processing
- Battista Biggio
- Fabio Roli
- Davide Maiorca
- Giorgio Giacinto
- Giorgio Fumera
- Pavel Laskov
- Igino Corona
- Nedim Srndic
Citations in the corpus
- Practical Evasion of a Learning-Based Classifier: A Case Study (2014, background): “Our implementation takes a malicious file and simply attempts to modify all of its modifiable features at once to take on the values of the features of a chosen mimicry target, a benign file.”
- NEZHA: Efficient Domain-Independent Differential Testing (2017, methodology): “PDF, or XZ (a popular archive format), according to their respective specifications, in order to accurately detect malicious content hidden in such files [41].”
- Using Frankencerts for Automated Adversarial Testing of Certificate Validation in SSL/TLS Implementations (2014, background): “The class of certificate validation vulnerabilities analyzed in this paper is complementary to and has little overlap with the vulnerabilities discovered in [29, 31].”
- Looking at the bag is not enough to find the bomb: an evasion of structural methods for malicious PDF files detection (2013, background): “In a recent work, Jana and Shmatikov [23] showed that such kind of errors are pretty common in malware detectors, and actually represent the weakest link of malware defense.”
- Adversarial attacks against intrusion detection systems: Taxonomy, solutions and open issues (2013, background): “In this case, an adversary can easily create new malware instances that defeat such measurement heuristics [72].”
- CryptoLock (and Drop It): Stopping Ransomware Attacks on User Data (2016, background): “Furthermore, recent research has shown that evading signature detection is possible with relative ease when the malware signatures used are too rigid [9], [24], [32], [33].”
- The Art, Science, and Engineering of Fuzzing: A Survey (2018, background): “ing [140], [232], kernel testing [226], [204], [193], representation dependence testing [125], function detection [237], robustness evaluation [233], exploit development [115], GUI testing [206], signature generation [75], penetration testing [84], [162], embedded devices [161], and neural network t”
- When a Tree Falls: Using Diversity in Ensemble Classifiers to Identify Evasion in Malware Detectors (2016, background): “One of the main weaknesses of systems that employ machine learning classification in adversarial environments is their susceptibility to evasion attacks.”
- Detection of Malicious PDF Files Based on Hierarchical Document Structure (2013, background): “This reduces the opportunity for evasion techniques exploiting the ambiguities in file processing [16].”
- Pattern Recognition Systems under Attack: Design Issues and Research Challenges (2014, background): “4.1, and how to re-engineer their design cycle, using a proactive approach.”
- On the feasibility of online malware detection with performance counters (2013, background): “In a recent paper, Jana and Shmatikov [9] found that all of the 36 commercially available AV systems they examined could be bypassed.”