Privatization, Competition, and Corruption: How Characteristics of Bribe Takers and Payers Affect Bribe Payments to Utilities

By George R. G. Clarke, Lixin Colin Xu. 2002

125 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Information Systems, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f226ff2fe9ce13b0e0634d3ec9ba1c9c2ae230da

Citations in the corpus

• Understanding corruption and firm responses in cross-national firm-level surveys (2010, unknown): “For examples of the firm-level data-based analyses, see Batra, Kaufmann, and Stone (2003), Clarke and Xu (2004), Escribano and Guasch (2005), Fisman and Gatti (2006), Gray, Hellman, and Ryterman (2004), Hellman et al. (2006), Hellman and Kaufmann (2004), Lee, Oh, and Eden (forthcoming), Svensson…”
• Ownership, Investment Climate and Firm Performance: Evidence from Chinese Firms (2006, unknown): “When infrastructure is poor, bribes are often required to get telephone or electricity connections (Clarke and Xu, 2004).”
• Property rights protection, corporate transparency, and growth (2009, unknown): “More recent studies on the effects of bribery on firms’ profitability include Svensson (2003) and Clarke and Xu (2003). A number of papers examine the reasons why private businesses move “underground,” and consider the effects of the presence of organized crime (Alexeev, Janeba, and Osborne (2004)),”