How psychopaths threaten moral rationalism: Is it irrational to be amoral?
By Shaun Nichols. 2002
106 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f08c6d6784ffd8cfc20fed1f8b4cc242533cc5c3
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Citations in the corpus
- Are ethical judgments intrinsically motivational? Lessons from "acquired sociopathy" [1] (2003, background): “Some empirical studies already indicate that normal people are not inclined to judge moral terms according to the internalist platitude (Nichols, 2002).”
- What is moral reasoning? (2015, background): “Some people argue that psychopaths show that moral judgments do not necessarily motivate, because psychopaths seem to make genuine moral judgments but do not act in ways consistent with them (Nichols, 2002; Roskies, 2003; Svavarsdottir, 1999).”
- On The Genealogy Of Norms: A Case For The Role Of Emotion In Cultural Evolution* (2002, background): “By 18 months or so, children seem to be emotionally sensitive not just to distress cues, but to the knowledge that someone else is in pain (Nichols 2001).7 I suggest that our emotional sensitivity to suffering in others played an important role in securing for harm-norms the central role they…”