Rational choice with status quo bias

By Yusufcan Masatlioglu, Efe A. Ok. Journal of Economics Theory, 2005

393 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f078e4b2d5f360fb2c9f69c2d36d8f9b4b909d79

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Citations in the corpus

Expected utility theory without the completeness axiom (2004, background): “Finally, Masatlioglu and Ok [15] shows how incompleteness of preferences may arise due to status quo bias and/or endowment effect, again within the revealed preference paradigm.”
(A,f): Choice With Frames (2008, neutral): “Zhou (1997), Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) (2006) and Sagi (2006) study axiomatizations within this model.”
Reference-dependent utility with shifting reference points and incomplete preferences (2007, neutral): “There has recently been a revived interest in incomplete preference relations (Dubra, Maccheroni, & Ok, 2004; Eliaz & Ok, 2006; Girotto & Holzer, 2005; Maccheroni, 2004; Mandler, 2005; Masatlioglu & Ok, 2005; Ok, 2002, earlier contributions are Aumann, 1962; Bewley, 1986; Vind, 1991).”
On the multi-utility representation of preference relations ✩ (2011, methodology): “It is recently observed that various referencedependent choice models necessitate the use of incomplete preferences (cf. Masatlioglu and Ok (2005), Apesteguia and Ballester (2006), Sagi (2007) and Ok, Ortoleva and Riella (2007)).”
CATEGORIZE THEN CHOOSE: BOUNDEDLY RATIONAL CHOICE AND WELFARE (2012, background): “dersen and Sandroni [8], Masatlioglu and Ok ([ 23 ], [24]) and Masatlioglu and Nakajima”
Bias in Favor of the Status Quo (2012, background): “Masatlioglu and Ok (2005) point to the shift in the kind of judgment one makes when a status quo alternative exists.”
A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences (2006, methodology): “In this paper we build on the essential intuitions in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and subsequent models of reference dependence, but flesh out, extend, and modify these models to build a realistic and more general theory of reference-dependent preferences that can be systematically applied to a…”