Information flow inference for ML
By F. Pottier, Vincent Simonet. ACM-SIGACT Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, 2002
520 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Hardware and Architecture
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/efd7da55f365ad125a295fb0a77d4b07fa6c2330
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Marco Gaboardi
- Martín Abadi
- Michael R. Clarkson
- Cédric Fournet
- A. Myers
- Ranjit Jhala
- Gian Pietro Farina
- Stephen Chong
In Hardware and Architecture
- A. Myers
- Steve Zdancewic
- Bruno Blanchet
- Ranjit Jhala
- D. Clarke
- Sorin Lerner
- Andrei Sabelfeld
- Marco Gaboardi
Citations in the corpus
- Observational determinism for concurrent program security (2003, background): “Program-counter labels ( pc) are used to track implicit information flows [49, 30].”
- Securing web application code by static analysis and runtime protection (2004, background): “They reported that the total number of Web application vulnerabilities discovered in 2002 was 178% higher than in 2001, that 95 percent of these were remotely exploitable, and that 99 percent were considered highly or moderately severe.”
- Relational Symbolic Execution (2017, methodology): “Inspired by the approach of Pottier and Simonet [2003], we extend the grammar of FOR with a pair constructor 〈· | ·〉 which can be used at the level of values 〈v1 | v2〉, expressions 〈e1 | e2〉, or commands 〈c1 | c2〉 (see Figure 7).”
- An empirical study of privacy-violating information flows in JavaScript web applications (2010, methodology): “These include type systems [31, 23], model checking [28], Hoarelogics [1], and dataflow analyses [18, 26].”
- Hyperproperties (2010, background): “Consider an observer of an execution of a system, who is permitted to see each new state as it is produced by the system; otherwise, the system is opaque to the observer.”
- Language-based information-flow security (2003, methodology): “Pottier and Simonet [14], [77] prove noninterference for an extension of the purely functional part of SLam, extended with references, exceptions, and type polymorphism.”
- Dytan: a generic dynamic taint analysis framework (2007, background): “, [16, 20]) is the static counterpart of dynamic taint analysis.”
- Noninterference via Symbolic Execution (2012, background): “The policy has been substantially studied in the language-based security community [16] and typically relies on information flow type systems [15, 21, 22]; however, these are criticized for being conservative and rejecting many secure programs.”
- Automated verification of selected equivalences for security protocols (2005, background): “have already proved useful in other contexts—in particular, in elegant soundness proofs of information-flow type systems [22, 23].”
- Modeling and Verifying Security Protocols with the Applied Pi Calculus and ProVerif (2016, methodology): “This idea extends the technique of (Pottier and Simonet, 2002; Pottier, 2002) for information flow (without cryptography) to the case of security protocols.”