Free Cash Flow, Debt Monitoring, and Audit Pricing: Further Evidence on the Role of Director Equity Ownership
By Ferdinand A. Gul, J. Tsui. 2001
142 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/eedf30fbe4590c26053655501e1bd10e83ed2254
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Citations in the corpus
- Determinants of Auditor Choice: Evidence from a Small Client Market (2008, unknown): “and Wilson 1988; Gul and Tsui 2001, Krishnan 2003).”
- Earnings Management: An Analysis of Opportunistic Behaviour, Monitoring Mechanism and Financial Distress (2015, background): “Previous literature provides that when the surplus free cash flow is high, the manager will obtain their personal benefits (Ross, 1973; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Gul, 2001).”
- The Impacts of Free Cash Flows and Agency Costs on Firm Performance (2010, methodology): “More studies supporting the effect of firm size could be seen in Gul and Tsui [19], Grullon and Michaely [36], and Singh and Davidson [26].”