Two neural correlates of consciousness.

By Ned Block. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2005

633 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ee295c61d617f6d31708b634b377bb69c05ed4be

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In Cognitive Neuroscience

Citations in the corpus

Basic Emotions, Natural Kinds, Emotion Schemas, and a New Paradigm (2007, background): “I hypothesize that the percept needs to register only in phenomenal consciousness for the basic emotion to become functional (cf. Block, 2001, 2005; Lambie & Marcel, 2002; Rosenthal, 2002).”
Attention, Visual Consciousness and Indeterminacy (2011, background): “Changes in these processes are implicated in changes in the course of conscious visual experience (Lamme, 2005), which suggests that they form part of a minimal sufficient condition on that experience (Block, 2005).”
The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct (2011, background): “The two points of view can be usefully combined if we hold that a reflexive conscious state is one that is phenomenally presented in a higher order representation of it (Block 2005a).”
A taxonomy of external and internal attention. (2011, neutral): “The relation between attention and conscious awareness requires substantial review, available elsewhere (Block 2005, Dehaene et al. 2006, Koch & Tsuchiya 2007, Rees et al. 2002, Rensink 2000).”
Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World (2007, background): “These two functions are not only conceptually distinct but they may even involve different neural mechanisms (Block, 2005).”
Pupillometry (2012, background): “…and Donaldson (1999) already explicitly suggested that the cognitive aspects of the pupillary response are preconscious; that is, the pupil can indicate the presence of processing that takes place before conscious perception and that may be necessary for phenomenal awareness (cf. Block, 2005).”
Automated rationale generation: a technique for explainable AI and its effects on human perceptions (2019, background): “not have a consciously accessible neural correlate of the decisionmaking process [8, 9, 19].”
Human-centered Explainable AI: Towards a Reflective Sociotechnical Approach (2020, background): “The philosophical intuition behind rationale generation is that humans can engage in effective communication by verbalizing plausible motivations for their actions, even when the verbalized reasoning does not have a consciously-accessible neural correlate of the decision-making process [22,10,9].”
Embodiment or envatment? Reflections on the bodily basis of consciousness (2010, background): “Ned Block (2005a) has recently argued that this sort of proposal fails to distinguish clearly between causation and constitution, that is, between L”
Conscious Processing and the Global Neuronal Workspace Hypothesis (2020, positive): “One distinction relates to ‘‘phenomenal consciousness’’ versus ‘‘access consciousness’’ (Block, 2005).”
Intracranial neural representation of phenomenal and access consciousness in the human brain (2024, methodology): “Z. Fang et al. However, the importance and authenticity of this framework has been doubted, i.e. some researchers argued that there is only one, but not two, NCC (Cohen and Dennett, 2011; Baars and Laureys, 2005; Block, 2005).”