Secret-ballot receipts: True voter-verifiable elections

By David Chaum. IEEE Security & Privacy Magazine, 2004

539 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

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Analysis of an electronic voting system (2004, background): “…the 2004 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P’04) 1081-6011/04 $ 20.00 © 2004 IEEE party introduces flaws into the voting system software or takes advantage of pre-existing flaws, then the results of the election cannot be assured to accurately reflect the votes legally cast by the voters.”
A Practical Voter-Verifiable Election Scheme (2005, methodology): “The original scheme of [3] uses visual cryptography to encrypt the receipts and perform the decryption in the booth.”
Verifying privacy-type properties of electronic voting protocols (2009, unknown): “A third kind of scheme uses randomisation (for example by mixnets) to mix up the votes so that the link between voter and vote is lost [16] [17].”
A Survey of Verifiable Computation (2017, background): “The notion of end-to-end voting was first proposed to ensure the verifiability of voting systems [58].”
Coercion-resistant electronic elections (2005, unknown): “Wagner [31] have identified vulnerabilities in the influential and innovative schemes of Chaum and Neff [ 20 ,39].”