Equity Incentives and Long-Term Value Created by SG&A Expenditure

By Rajiv D. Banker, Ronghong Huang, Ramachandran Natarajan. 2011

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The Impact of Changes in Regulation on Cost Behavior (2015, unknown): “Although doubts with regard to the validity of the interpretation of the findings as active cost management have been raised (Anderson and Lanen 2009; Balakrishnan and Gruca 2008; Balakrishnan et al. 2010b; Banker et al. 2011), asymmetric cost behavior appears to be a phenomenon that needs to be inv”
A review of the IFRS adoption literature (2016, background): “47 Although Paul (1992) predicts that the valuation role of earnings is independent of the managerial-incentive contracting role of earnings, Bushman, Engel, and Smith (2006) and Banker et al. (2009) extend analysis and provide empirical evidence to show that earnings can play a role in both valuati”
The Agency Problem, Corporate Governance, and the Asymmetrical Behavior of Selling, General, and Administrative Costs (2012, unknown): “To alleviate the endogeneity concern, we first regress FCF on the second moment of FCF and then use the resulting predicted value of FCF in (2) (Lewbel 1997; Banker et al. 2011).”
Organization Capital and Mergers and Acquisitions (2017, unknown): “Using SG&A expenses as a proxy for input resource expenditure, Banker et al. (2011) show that in firms where input resource expenditures create considerable future value, managers increase these expenditures after receiving long-term incentives.”