Speed of issuance and the adequacy of disclosure in the 144A high-yield debt market
By George W. Fenn. 2000
143 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ebca3ed36439330e39b907a1505c9dfac2348d79
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Amy K. Edwards
- Lawrence E. Harris
- Michael S. Piwowar
- C. Bannier
- Jeffrey A. Pittman
- Brenda van Tendeloo
- Andre Guettler
- Clive Lennox
In Finance
- Amy K. Edwards
- Lawrence E. Harris
- Michael S. Piwowar
- C. Bannier
- Jeffrey A. Pittman
- Brenda van Tendeloo
- Andre Guettler
- Clive Lennox
Citations in the corpus
- Earnings Management and Audit Quality in Europe: Evidence from the Private Client Segment Market (2008, background): “Similar to Fenn (2000) we exclude”
- The choice among bank debt, non-bank private debt, and public debt: evidence from new corporate borrowings☆ (2003, unknown): “To comply with the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, firms must receive the unanimous consent of public bondholders to alter any of the material terms in the bond indenture. This can cause severe holdout problems for publicly traded bonds, which tend to be held by many investors. Gilson, John and Lang (1”
- Rating opaque borrowers: why are unsolicited ratings lower? (2010, methodology): “The agencies’ incentive to blackmail may also increase in the borrower’s opaqueness: the more opaque an issuer, the easier it is for an agency to legitimate the subsequent increase in rating level due to the disclosure of private information in the solicitation process.”
- Corporate Bond Market Transaction Costs and Transparency (2007, background): “Because Rule 144a bonds trade in a market that is restricted to large institutions and the disclosure requirements for the issues are lower, we expect the transaction costs of Rule 144a bonds to differ from fully registered bonds (see Fenn (2000)).”
- The pricing of green bonds: external reviews and the shades of green (2020, unknown): “Such information costs are generally priced in bond markets (Fenn 2000).”
- Voluntary Audits Versus Mandatory Audits (2011, background): “Reinforcing that this testing ground suits our inquiry, Fenn (2000) and Santos (2006) report that lenders demand higher yields on private companies’ debt to compensate for the worse information asymmetry that they suffer.8 This evidence squares with Graham et al.’s (2005) finding from a survey of…”
- The Costs, Wealth Effects, and Determinants of International Capital Raising: Evidence from Public Yankee Bonds (2002, unknown): “Another benefit to issuing debt is that once a firm has issued debt in the U.S. market, it is likely to provide credit analysts with relevant information on an on-going basis (Fenn, 2000).”
- Liquidity and Asset Prices (2005, unknown): “Fenn (2000) too examines the difference between the yield spreads on bonds traded in the private and public markets.”
- Capital Structure and Debt Structure (2010, unknown): “4 There is substantial evidence that Rule 144A private placements are more like bonds than concentrated private placements held by one or two insurance companies (Fenn (2000) and Gomes and Phillips (2005)).”