Beauty is aB east, Frog is aP rince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities ∗

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Risk Pooling, Risk Preferences, and Social Networks (2012, background): “As in Sadoulet (2000), Legros and Newman (2004) and Chiappori and Reny (2004) have shown, additional transfers could result in negative assortative matching among close friends and family members.”
Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation (2010, background): “…sorting on exogenous productivity types, where Becker (1973) and the subsequent literature established supermodularity-type conditions that ensure that agents sort monotonically in their types (see, for instance, Shimer and Smith (2000), Legros and Newman (2007), and Eeckhout and Kircher (2010)).”
Fatter Attraction: Anthropometric and Socioeconomic Matching on the Marriage Market (2012, methodology): “Models of frictionless matching without transferable utility have been developed by Chiappori and Reny (2004), Legros and Newman (2007) and Browning, Chiappori and Weiss (2010).”
Complementarity and Aggregate Implications of Assortative Matching: A Nonparametric Analysis (2014, unknown): “2 Correlated Matching Allocations The perfect positive and negative assortative allocations are focal allocations, being emphasized in the economic theory literature (e.g., Becker and Murphy, 2000; Legros and Newman, 2004).”