Monitoring Elite Capture in Community‐Driven Development
By J. Platteau. 2004
589 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Development, Political Science and International Relations, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/eb77ddccf6bae21b9b98285566edba0886fb4f40
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Development
- Victoria A. Beard
- Kimuli Kasara
- Beatriz Magaloni
- K. Deininger
- Aniruddha Dasgupta
- Yanyan Liu
- Robert S. Chase
- Elinor Ostrom
In Political Science and International Relations
- Elinor Ostrom
- Victoria A. Beard
- Kimuli Kasara
- Beatriz Magaloni
- K. Deininger
- Basudeb Guha-Khasnobis
- Aniruddha Dasgupta
- Yanyan Liu
In Safety Research
- Elinor Ostrom
- Julien Labonne
- Robert S. Chase
- Julia P. G. Jones
- Victoria A. Beard
- Kimuli Kasara
- Beatriz Magaloni
- K. Deininger
Citations in the corpus
- Understanding decentralized forest governance: an application of the institutional analysis and development framework (2006, background): “Traditional and informal social networks characterized by severe power asymmetries and patronage relationships often trump formal democratic structures and hamper any real democratic decentralized governance of natural resources (Andersson, 2002; Platteau, 2004).”
- Tax Me If You Can: Ethnic Geography, Democracy, and the Taxation of Agriculture in Africa (2007, background): “Second, research on the allocation of resources within communities suggests that locallevel inequalities of wealth, education, and access to political power exert a powerful influence on who benefits from these resources (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000; Platteau 2004).”
- Who is Vouching for the Input Voucher? Decentralized Targeting and Elite Capture in Tanzania (2011, unknown): “…other hand find that China’s community based development program—its flagship poverty alleviation program—only increased the incomes of the better off in each village, and not these of the poor and Platteau (2004) shows that the local elite took control of social fund expenditures in West Africa.”
- Community Driven Development, Collective Action and Elite Capture in Indonesia (2007, background): “1 The expanded use of community-based approaches by large-scale institutional actors has made more pressing the need to rigorously evaluate its foundational propositions and its vulnerability to elite capture (Blair, 2000; Conning and Kevane, 2002; Cooke and Kothari, 2002; Galasso and Ravallion, 200”
- Polycentric Systems as One Approach for Solving Collective-Action Problems (2008, background): “When local elite is empowered at the collective choice level, policies that primarily benefit them can be expected (Platteau 2003, 2004; Ensminger 1990).”
- Traditional Governance, Citizen Engagement, and Local Public Goods: Evidence from Mexico (2014, background): “For a general critique of participatory models of local level development see Platteau (2004).”
- Analyzing decentralized resource regimes from a polycentric perspective (2008, background): “Perhaps the most commonly cited source of failure of a decentralized system is the problem of local tyrannies (Platteau 2004; Platteau and Gaspart 2003; Andersson and van Laerhoven 2007; Johnson 2001).”
- Beyond Formality and Informality (2006, background): “Policies introduced to ‘formalize’ these arrangements have been criticized in light of their sometimes counterproductive consequences (Platteau and Gaspart 2003; Platteau 2004; Agrawal and Gupta 2005).”
- Who Is at the Wheel When Communities Drive Development? Evidence from the Philippines (2009, background): “The term can be used to refer to the traditional elite, to educated people and political leaders (Dasgupta & Beard, 2007; Platteau, 2004; Platteau & Gaspart, 2003), to motivated individuals (Rao & Ibáñez, 2005) or to prime movers (White, 2002).”
- Can REDD+ social safeguards reach the ‘right’ people? Lessons from Madagascar (2016, background): “…strong enough in safeguarding vulnerable groups (Menton et al., 2014) and that benefit distribution in existing projects has suffered from elite capture (see for example, Platteau and Gaspart, 2003; Platteau, 2004; Mansuri and Rao, 2004; Corbera et al., 2007; Larson, 2011; Pascual et al., 2014).”
- Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India (2012, unknown): “5See Platteau (2004) for general discussion of elite capture and an interesting West African case study.”