Corporate Tax‐Planning Effectiveness: The Role of Compensation‐Based Incentives
By John D. Phillips. 2003
430 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e955c114a8923b57642e4b2efcb7df9854086d72
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Jennifer Blouin
- Michelle Hanlon
- Liandong Zhang
- Christopher S. Armstrong
- David F. Larcker
- Edward L. Maydew
- Jeong‐Bon Kim
- Scott D. Dyreng
In Economics and Econometrics
- Michelle Hanlon
- Jennifer Blouin
- Scott D. Dyreng
- Edward L. Maydew
- Liandong Zhang
- Luo Zuo
- Fabio B. Gaertner
- Christopher S. Armstrong
Citations in the corpus
- Home Country Tax System Characteristics and Corporate Tax Avoidance: International Evidence (2012, background): “compensation (Rego and Wilson 2008); effective tax rates are lower when managers’ incentive compensation is based on after-tax versus pre-tax performance measures (Phillips 2003; Gaertner 2010); proposed IRS deficiencies are positively associated with the percentage of annual compensation that is in”
- The Importance of the Internal Information Environment for Tax Avoidance (2015, background): “” Recent studies have looked at the interaction between tax avoidance and performance management and control, finding associations between measures of tax aggressiveness and the use of after-tax performance measures for business unit managers (Phillips, 2003), the value of stock option grants to the”
- Corporate Governance, Incentives, and Tax Avoidance (2015, background): “Consistent with this notion, there is empirical evidence that tax avoidance is associated with greater levels of incentive compensation (e.g., Phillips, 2003; Armstrong et al., 2012; Rego and Wilson, 2012).”
- Corporate Political Connections and Tax Aggressiveness (2013, neutral): “, Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Rego and Wilson 2012), division or tax manager incentives (e.g., Armstrong et al. 2012; Phillips 2003; Robinson et al. 2010), corporate governance (Chyz et al.”
- Corporate Tax Avoidance and Stock Price Crash Risk: Firm-Level Analysis (2011, positive): “…tax avoidance is value enhancing, and managers should be motivated and compensated for engaging in such activities.8 An example of this view of tax avoidance is Phillips (2003), who finds that compensating business unit managers on an after-tax basis lowers a firm’s effective tax rates.”
- Do Corporate Governance Characteristics Influence Tax Management (2010, result): “Results show that as company size increases, tax rates do as well, consistent with other research (Zimmerman, 1983; Rego, 2003).”
- Corporate social responsibility and tax avoidance: A comment and reflection (2013, neutral): “and Rego (2009), Mills (1998), Phillips (2003) and Rego (2003).”
- Conforming Tax Avoidance and Capital Market Pressure (2019, neutral): “…the average effective tax rate (ETR) is one of the first measures of corporate tax avoidance commonly used in the accounting literature (e.g., Phillips 2003; Rego 2003).8 Recent research typically calculates the average ETR as the ratio of total tax expense to pretax income, although other…”
- Customer-Supplier Relationships and Corporate Tax Avoidance (2017, background): “…the managershareholder relationship by examining the effects of managerial compensation contracts, ownership structure, and corporate governance on tax avoidance (e.g., Armstrong, Blouin, and Larcker, 2012, 2013; Chen et al., 2010; Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; Phillips 2003; Rego and Wilson, 2012).”