Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt Across Three Centuries
By Michael Tomz. 2007
290 citations recorded by the source corpus.
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e90bc3bb4977d543ef4aa3bf2f8511054e7a7d3c
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
- Michael Tomz
- Mark L. J. Wright
- Emily Beaulieu
- G. Cox
- David A. Lake
- Sebastián Saiegh
- J. Hatchondo
- Thomas Oatley
Citations in the corpus
- Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default (2013, background): “Moreover, emerging markets have repaid bondholders at a higher rate than commercial banks (Tomz 2007).”
- Open economy politics: A critical review (2009, background): “Michael Tomz (2007) looks at the time inconsistency problem in international lending when there is uncertainty about the borrower’s willingness to repay, and how states use (and abuse) reputations to solve this problem.”
- The Forgotten History of Domestic Debt (2011, unknown): “Of course, during the post–World War II era, many governments did repress domestic financial markets, with low deposit rate ceilings and high bank reserve requirements, among other devices.”
- Playing Favorites: How Shared Beliefs Shape the IMF's Lending Decisions (2014, unknown): “Tomz 2007.”
- From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis (2011, unknown): “This source has been supplemented with additional information from Lindert and Morton (1989), Christian Suter (1992) and Michael Tomz (2007).”
- Sovereign Debt and Regime Type: Reconsidering the Democratic Advantage (2012, background): “…for example, Eichengreen and Mody 1998, and in some studies of foreign direct investment ~FDI!, for example, Jensen 2003+ 12+ On reputation and credibility, see Tomz 2007+ For more on credit rationing, see Ghosh,Mookherjee, and Ray 2001; and Robinson 2006+ 13+ For recent surveys of…”
- Sovereign Risk Premia (2011, unknown): “As Hatchondo, Martinez and Sapriza (2007) note, in this framework, the equilibrium size of debt is smaller when the exclusion from capital markets is shorter.”