Causal imprinting in causal structure learning.

By Eric G. Taylor, Woo-Kyoung Ahn. 2012

20 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Suppose one observes a correlation between two events, B and C, and infers that B causes C. Later one discovers that event A explains away the correlation between B and C. Normatively, one should now dismiss or weaken the belief that B causes C. Nonetheless, participants in the current study who observed a positive contingency between B and C followed by evidence that B and C were independent given A, persisted in believing that B causes C. The authors term this difficulty in revising initially learned causal structures “causal imprinting.” Throughout four experiments, causal imprinting was obtained using multiple dependent measures and control conditions. A Bayesian analysis showed that causal imprinting may be normative under some conditions, but causal imprinting also occurred in the current study when it was clearly non-normative. It is suggested that causal imprinting occurs due to the influence of prior knowledge on how reasoners interpret later evidence. Consistent with this view, when participants first viewed the evidence showing that B and C are independent given A, later evidence with only B and C did not lead to the belief that B causes C.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Developmental and Educational Psychology, History and Philosophy of Science

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In Artificial Intelligence

  1. Nikos Ntoumanis
  2. Eric Mandelbaum
  3. Kimberley J. Bartholomew

In Developmental and Educational Psychology

  1. Kimberley J. Bartholomew
  2. Sebastiano Costa
  3. Nikos Ntoumanis
  4. Eric Mandelbaum
  5. J. Reeve
  6. Dana Perlman
  7. J. Duda
  8. Robert J. Vallerand

In History and Philosophy of Science

  1. Eric Mandelbaum

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