Budget Processes and Commitment to Fiscal Discipline

By J. Hagen, I. Harden. Kredit und Kapital, 2019

220 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Abstract We present a framework of investigation into the political economy of the budget process. Our model suggests that institutional rules governing the budget process can be found to limit the importance of fiscal illusion. Empirical evidence supports that proposition. The choice of rules depends on the political environment as well as the dominant source of uncertainty in the budget process. JEL Classification: H61, H62, D71, D73, H72

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e839f3c8e00b4dde78d760fa34b376d96deeb9c1

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In Economics and Econometrics

1. X. Debrun
2. Catherine A. Pattillo
3. Andrew Hodge
4. L. Eyraud

Citations in the corpus

• Second-Generation Fiscal Rules; Balancing Simplicity, Flexibility, and Enforceability (2018, background): “Von Hagen and Harden (1995) show that binding fiscal rules agreed among coalition partners (“contracts”) can coordinate the competing demands on public monies and internalize the tax externality.”