The Leverage Cycle

By John D. Geanakoplos. NBER macroeconomics annual, 2010

1,195 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e837a1876c8405032fc40b5c495d38a047c59095

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Citations in the corpus

Bank Capital Redux: Solvency, Liquidity, and Crisis (2017, positive): “With higher bank leverage, more capital or net worth is lost for a given shock to assets, in turn reducing intermediaries’ ability to extend credit, and increasing the likelihood of distressed fire sales (He and Krishnamurthy (2013); Geanakoplos (2010); Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)).”
Bank Leverage Cycles (2017, positive): “Similarly, Geanakoplos (2010) or Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008), consider shocks that not only decrease the expected asset returns but also their volatility.”
Business, Housing and Credit Cycles (2018, background): “Given the key role of the leverage cycle in the emergence of financial imbalances (Geanakoplos, 2009; Jordà et al., 2014), an important element in these discussions is macro-prudential policies aimed at dampening cyclical fluctuations in credit volumes and residential property prices (Cerutti et…”
Elimination of systemic risk in financial networks by means of a systemic risk transaction tax (2014, background): “These cascades can potentially wipe out the financial system by a de-leveraging cascade (Minsky 1992, Adrian and Shin 2008, Fostel and Geanakoplos 2008, Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009, Geanakoplos 2010, Thurner et al. 2012, Caccioli et al. 2012, Poledna et al. 2014,Aymanns and Farmer 2015, Caccioli…”
Cross-Border Banking and Global Liquidity (2015, background): “The fact that global banks can borrow at the risk-free rate is reminiscent of Geanakoplos (2010) and Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012), who also have the feature that borrowers probability of default is zero, but for reasons that are di¤erent from our model.”
Regulating Capital Flows to Emerging Markets: An Externality View (2018, neutral): “12This setup follows the tradition of Stiglitz (1982) and Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) and captures that policymakers have instruments to regulate financial market allocations, but that they are subject to the laws of demand and supply when they attempt to manipulate market prices such as th”