Combining rate-based and cap-and-trade emissions policies
By C. Fischer. 2003
125 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e7fca4d0e8bb4d669b4c84311f142a3c8a51a27e
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In Economics and Econometrics
In Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment
- Richard G. Newell
- C. Fischer
- William A. Pizer
- W. Oates
- J. Kruger
- David Popp
- F. Polzin
- Richard S. J. Tol
Citations in the corpus
- Carbon markets 15 years after Kyoto: Lessons learned, new challenges (2013, background): “For example, Fischer (2003) shows that linking a system that is indexed to output with an ordinary capped system almost always increases emissions.”
- International technology-oriented agreements to address climate change (2008, background): “Moreover, performance standards can have lesser effects on competitiveness: although the standards may raise product costs, emissions prices also would impose the cost of the embodied emissions, further raising marginal production costs (Bernard et al., forthcoming; Fischer and Fox, forthcoming; Fis”
- Decentralization in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and Lessons for Global Policy (2007, background): “As Fischer (2003) points out, if output in country A is affected by the linking of the systems, this will (by definition) affect the aggregate cap level.”
- Emissions targets and the real business cycle: Intensity targets versus caps or taxes (2011, unknown): “5 These results echo those in static models, such as Fischer [31] and Fischer and Fox [11].”
- Output-Based Allocation of Emissions Permits for Mitigating Tax and Trade Interactions (2007, unknown): “OBA, by6 See Fischer (2003). weakening conservation incentives, raises the costs of achieving an emissions target, and in a multi-sector permit market, the overall efficiency loss depends on the distribution of the sector allotments and the effective subsidies.”