The Microeconomics of Banking
By P. Ngo. 2009
705 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e7d688587abe1c7cde5be5bd52b16e81860d69cb
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Geraldo Cerqueiro
- Denis Nadolnyak
- Valentina Hartarska
- T. Jokipii
- David Marqués-Ibáñez
- Alistair Milne
- Sumit Agarwal
- Steven R. G. Ongena
In Economics and Econometrics
- Philipp Schnabl
- I. Drechsler
- Denis Nadolnyak
- Sumit Agarwal
- Valentina Hartarska
- T. Jokipii
- David Marqués-Ibáñez
- Alistair Milne
In Finance
- Steven R. G. Ongena
- Philipp Schnabl
- Sumit Agarwal
- Geraldo Cerqueiro
- I. Drechsler
- Valentina Hartarska
- T. Jokipii
- David Marqués-Ibáñez
Citations in the corpus
- Distance and Private Information in Lending (2010, background): “Traditionally, such models have focused on uniform loan pricing (e.g., Chiappori, Perez-Castrillo, and Verdier 1995; see Freixas and Rochet 2008 for a survey).”
- Interbank Liquidity Crunch and the Firm Credit Crunch: Evidence from the 2007--2009 Crisis (2013, neutral): “See for example Freixas and Rochet (2008), and Tirole (2006). ! 7 See Khwaja and Mian (2008).”
- Who Borrows from the Lender of Last Resort (2016, background): “For example, Goodfried and King 3For an excellent survey of the issue see Freixas and Rochet (2008).”
- Examining the Relationships between Capital, Risk and Efficiency in European Banking (2007, neutral): “Yet, the theoretical literature offers contradictory results as to the optimal design of capital adequacy regulation and to the effects of capital requirements on bank risk-taking incentives (see Berger et al., 1995; Freixas and Rochet, 1997; Santos, 1999; Boot et al., 1999; Rime, 2001b) so that…”
- Double Bank Runs and Liquidity Risk Management (2016, neutral): “by carrying out minimum level of risk management) by more fragile banks (see Freixas and Rochet (2008) for an overview).”
- Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-08 (2009, neutral): “Allen and Gale (2007) and Freixas and Rochet (1997), and references therein, are further useful starting points.”
- Bank capital buffer and risk adjustment decisions (2011, background): “The larger the charter value, the greater the incentive to reduce risk taking and to maintain a capital buffer that is not in danger of falling below the regulatory minimum.(19) The charter value thus acts as a restraint against moral hazard in banking (Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990; Demsetz et al.”
- Do regulated microfinance institutions achieve better sustainability and outreach? Cross-country evidence (2007, background): “From a public policy perspective, regulation is justified by market failure arising from asymmetric information, market power and negative externalities (Freixas and Rochet, 1997).”