Insider Lending and Bank Ownership: The Case of Russia☆

By Luc Laeven. 2001

163 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e753140ab7f3e2c7fdcd6dcde9868877a61e39f1

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate Governance: What’s Special About Banks? (2013, background): “Examples of such private benefits include short-term gains associated with executive compensation contracts, empire-building considerations (Jensen 1986), lending to related parties (Laeven 2001; La Porta, López-de-Silanes & Zamarripa 2003), fraud and outright looting (Akerlof & Romer 1993).”
The corporate governance of banks (2003, background): “Similarly, Laeven (2001) presents evidence that insiders in Russian banks diverted the flow of loans to themselves and then defaulted 71% of the time.”
Where Is Credit Due? Legal Institutions, Connections, and the Efficiency of Bank Lending in Vietnam (2009, background): “Laeven (2001) found that banks in Russia grant larger loans to firms which own equity in them.”
Financial Crises: Explanations, Types, and Implications (2013, unknown): “Still, the classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a) largely overlaps with that of Laeven and Valencia (2012).”
Are Private Banks More Efficient than Public Banks? Evidence from Russia (2008, unknown): “The largest part of the lending went to connected agents, regardless of the viability of the lending project, and with only very weak monitoring incentives (Laeven, 2001).”
Institution building and growth in transition economies (2005, background): “…the presence or absence of such phenomena as corruption (Shleifer and Vishny 1993), large unofficial economies (Johnson et al. 1997), asset stripping and tunneling (Johnson et al. 2000 and Friedman et al. 2003), related lending (Laeven 2001), and state capture more generally (Hellman et al. 2003).”
Bank ownership and executive perquisites: New evidence from an emerging market (2011, background): “…drastic differences in the legal and cultural landscape between the emerging markets and the developed markets, it is naive to assume that banks voluntarily play as effective monitoring roles in emerging markets as they do in developed markets (Barth et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2009; Laeven, 2001).”
Friends with Money (2012, background): “Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Charumilind, Kali and Wiwattanakantang (2006), Morck and Nakamura (1999) and Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990), Laeven (2001), and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Zamarripa (2003) study connected lending in Asia, Japan, Russia, and Mexico, respectively.”