The successor representation in human reinforcement learning

By Ida Momennejad, Evan M. Russek, J. H. Cheong, Matthew Botvinick, Nathaniel D. Daw, Samuel J. Gershman. 2016

409 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Theories of reward learning in neuroscience have focused on two families of algorithms thought to capture deliberative versus habitual choice. ‘Model-based’ algorithms compute the value of candidate actions from scratch, whereas ‘model-free’ algorithms make choice more efficient but less flexible by storing pre-computed action values. We examine an intermediate algorithmic family, the successor representation, which balances flexibility and efficiency by storing partially computed action values: predictions about future events. These pre-computation strategies differ in how they update their choices following changes in a task. The successor representation’s reliance on stored predictions about future states predicts a unique signature of insensitivity to changes in the task’s sequence of events, but flexible adjustment following changes to rewards. We provide evidence for such differential sensitivity in two behavioural studies with humans. These results suggest that the successor representation is a computational substrate for semi-flexible choice in humans, introducing a subtler, more cognitive notion of habit. Momennejad et al. formulate and provide evidence for the successor representation, a computational learning mechanism intermediate between the two dominant models (a fast but inflexible ‘model-free’ system and a flexible but slow ‘model-based’ one).

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience

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In Cognitive Neuroscience

  1. Nathaniel D. Daw
  2. R. J. Dolan
  3. Ida Momennejad
  4. Trevor W. Robbins
  5. Doina Precup
  6. Peter S. Dayan
  7. Timothy Edward John Behrens
  8. John P. O'Doherty

Citations in the corpus