ASSET LIQUIDITY, CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND SECURED DEBT
By Erwan Morellec. 2001
295 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e709b0ccf1d114971b50cd6c49edd8c9cd6f794d
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Ilya A. Strebulaev
- Ronald W. Anderson
- Efraim Benmelech
- Erwan Morellec
- S. Myers
- Karan Bhanot
- A. Mello
- Andrea L. Eisfeldt
In Finance
- Ronald W. Anderson
- Efraim Benmelech
- Andrea L. Eisfeldt
- Ilya A. Strebulaev
- Erwan Morellec
- S. Myers
- Karan Bhanot
- A. Mello
In Strategy and Management
- Ilya A. Strebulaev
- Efraim Benmelech
- S. Myers
- A. Mello
- Ronald W. Anderson
- Karan Bhanot
- S.Carbó Valverde
- Rafael López del Paso
Citations in the corpus
- Corporate Investment and Financing Under Asymmetric Information (2011, unknown): “…the magnitude of investment and financing distortions due to conflicts of interest between inside equityholders and outside investors (see Mello and Parsons, 1992; Morellec, 2001; Hennessy and Whited, 2007; Sundaresan and Wang, 2007; Hackbarth and Mauer, 2010; and Morellec and Schürhoff, 2010).”
- Can managerial discretion explain observed leverage ratios (2001, background): “See however Mello and Parsons (1992), Morellec (2001), Hennessy (2003), and Ju, Parrino, Poteshman, and Weisbach (2003).”
- Competition and the Cost of Debt (2012, unknown): “8In an earlier draft of this paper I used the excess price-cost margin as a proxy for the intensity of product market competition [Nickell (1996); Gaspar and Massa (2006); Morellec and Nikolov (2008)].”
- Should corporate debt include a rating trigger (2006, background): “…4.74 23.48 17 1124.82 8 (74.92) (8.39) (12.02) (3.89) (76.41) (8.1) default is determined endogenously.2 Asset substitution, bankruptcy costs, and tax benefits have also been integrated in models such as Mello and Parsons (1992), Ross (1997), Leland (1998), Ericsson (2000), and Morellec (2001).”
- Financing and takeovers (2008, unknown): “Throughout the paper, we consider a stock-based definition of default whereby shareholders inject funds in the firm as long as equity value is positive (as in Leland, 1994; Mello and Parsons, 1992; Morellec, 2001).”
- Capital Structure, Firm Liquidity and Growth (2002, background): “Recently, Morellec (2001) provides an interesting analysis of the implications of liquidity that develops the asset transformation theme.”
- Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Dynamics (2012, unknown): “Third, our paper relates to the literature examining the effects of stockholder-bondholder conflicts (underinvestment and asset substitution) on firms’ financing decisions (see, for example, Leland (1998), Parrino and Weisbach (1999), Morellec (2001), or Carlson and Lazrak (2010)).”
- Intangible assets and capital structure (2020, background): “The relation between intangible assets and leverage has long been recognized theoretically, for example in Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Morellec (2001), but has been difficult to examine empirically.”
- Real Asset Illiquidity and the Cost of Capital (2014, unknown): “Highlighting that real asset illiquidity makes capital investments more costly to reverse, Pulvino (1998) and Ramey and Shapiro (2001) document significant price discounts for asset sales in illiquid markets.”
- A Theory of Takeovers and Disinvestment (2007, unknown): “Papers by Stulz (1990), Zwiebel (1996) and Morellec (2004) tackle much the same problem, but with interesting differences.”
- Collateral and Capital Structure (2009, background): “…Johnson (1985) argue that secured debt can facilitate follow-on investment and thus ameliorate a Myers (1977) type underinvestment problem in the presence of debt overhang.4 Morellec (2001) shows that secured debt prevents equityholders from liquidating assets to appropriate value from debtholders.”
- Asset Salability and Debt Maturity: Evidence from Nineteenth-Century American Railroads (2009, background): “Since Morellec (2001) shows that secured debt limits a firm’s ability to dispose of secured assets, it is unlikely that asset salability would be bad for creditors.”
- Optimal Capital Structure and Industry Dynamics (2005, unknown): “Leland (1994, 1998), Leland and Toft (1996), Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001), and Morellec (2001) analyze corporate asset valuation and optimal capital structure using analytical methods.”
- Can the excess of liquidity affect the effectiveness of the european monetary policy (2005, background): “It also diminishes the possibilities of transforming the assets portfolio, as well as the net value of the firm and, therefore, the collateral that can be offered (Morellec, 2001).”
- Asset Liquidity and Capital Structure (2009, unknown): “Second, I test the competing predictions of Myers and Rajan (1998) and Morellec (2001) regarding the effect of asset liquidity on leverage.”
- Do Some Business Models Perform Better than Others (2006, background): “Some models, such as Physical ones, might be more attractive to lending banks and therefore more amenable to a higher use of debt (see the large corporate finance literature on this, especially that related to debt capacity and “pledgeable income” – e.g., Morellec (2001)).”