Divisional Managers and Internal Capital Markets
By R. Duchin, D. Sosyura. 2013
229 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e6a00b62146276b26434b32b9118df8e7ea9e946
Citations in the corpus
- Political Connections and Allocative Distortions (2015, unknown): “…2007), peer effects (Sacerdote 2001; Lerner and Malmendier 2013; Shue 2013; Fracassi 2014), information flow (Bandiera and Rasul 2006; Conley and Udry 2010; Cohen et al. 2010; Engelberg et al. 2012; Duchin and Sosyura 2013), taste-based discrimination (Hwang and Kim 2009; Haselmann et al. 2017).”
- CEO Duality, Agency Costs, and Internal Capital Allocation Efficiency (2019, unknown): “…capital market efficiency literature, which aims to explain misallocation of resources and rent-payment by the CEO to the divisional managers, who receive unjustifiably more resource allocation for their divisions (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; Rajan et al ., 2000; Duchin and Sosyura, 2013).”
- Capital Allocation and Delegation of Decision-Making Authority within Firms (2014, unknown): “29 One form of corporate politics is evident in Duchin and Sosyura (2013), who find that managers with stronger social ties to the CEO make larger capital expenditures.”