Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive Versus Extensive Labor Supply Responses

By Emmanuel Saez. 2002

855 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Gender Studies

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e667fb45cb82fe2637eccb8faa0243b4ec948b63

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Citations in the corpus

Means-testing and tax rates on earnings: a contribution to the Mirrlees Review (2009, methodology): “36 In the US, there is little conclusive evidence that welfare benefits or the EITC have any effect on fertility (see Hoynes (1997) and Baughman and Dickert-Conlin (2007)) but studies of specific programmes in other countries have shown there to be small responses of fertility to childcontingent tra”
Optimal Welfare-to-Work Programs (2007, neutral): “Recently, Saez (2002) and Laroque (2005) have analyzed the optimality of certain income maintenance programs in the U.S. and France within static models where the worker type is private information. technology that can be used to observe the worker’s search effort and of a costly skill accumulation…”
The base for direct taxation (2008, positive): “See, e. g., Choné and Laroque, 2001, 2006, Diamond, 1980b, Saez, 2002c for the case of personal incomes or Griffith and Devereux, 2002 for the case of multinational corporations. interaction term.45 Once one envisions modeling longer lives, this degree of interaction becomes implausible to…”
Employment, Hours of Work and the Optimal Taxation of Low Income Families (2008, background): “As formalised by Saez (2002), whenever extensive labour supply responses are high at low earnings relative to intensive responses, low (or even negative) marginal tax rates are more likely to be optimal.”
Optimal Income Tax under the Threat of Migration by Top-Income Earners (2010, methodology): “4 in Laslier et al. (2003).18We get a mean of 0.2398 and a variance of 0.4403.19 As recently shown by Landais (2008), the value of the Pareto index of the income distribution is slightly higher in France than in the US, between 2 and 2.25 in France against 2 in the US (Saez, 2001).”
Female Labour Supply, Human Capital and Welfare Reform (2013, positive): “In a seminal paper, Saez (2002) showed that the optimal design of in-work benefits depends on how responsive individuals are at the intensive (hours of work) and extensive (whether to work) margins.”
The “flat tax(es)”: principles and experience (2008, background): “Even this is not assured, however, when participation decisions are realistically modeled ( Saez 2002 )o r the objective function is non-welfarist (Besley and Coate 1995 ;K anbur et al.1994).”
The Marginal Cost of Public Funds in OECD Countries; Hours of Work Versus Labor Force Participation (2003, background): “Our point is instead in line with that of Saez (2000) who extends the theory of optimal income taxation to incorporate both intensive and extensive labor supply responses.”
The 'Flat Tax(Es)': Principles and Evidence (2006, background): “Even these properties are not assured, however, when participation decisions are realistically modeled (Saez, 2002) or the objective function is non-welfarist (Besley and Coate (1995), Kanbur, Keen, and Tuomala (1994)).”
Ridesourcing systems: A framework and review (2019, methodology): “fleet size, and Santi et al. (2014) a 40% reduction in cumulative trip length in a ridesplitting situation, using taxi trip data from NYC.”
The Effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit and Recent Reforms (2010, background): “Saez (2002) considers a situation in which individuals have both participation and hours responses.”
Tax Me If You Can! Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax between Competing Governments (2014, positive): “In contrast, many papers have investigated the extensive margin where agents decide whether to work, either in isolation as in Laroque (2005) or in combination with an intensive choice as in Saez (2002), Kleven et al. (2009), or Jacquet et al. (2013).”
Trade and Unemployment: What Do the Data Say? (2011, background): “It therefore measures the total fiscal burden imposed on the worker (see also Saez (2002) or Immervoll et al. (2007)) and is sometimes referred to as the participation tax.”