Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm Value

By Benjamin Maury, Anete Pajuste. 2005

888 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e65a9845455088fb4de05b5d9f1b36353a9dd6ac

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Citations in the corpus

Family control and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China (2015, background): “…having multiple large shareholders does not alleviate agency conflicts because they do not play an active monitory role in the tunneling behavior of controlling families like they do in developed markets (Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000 and Bolton and Von Thadden, 1998).”
Do Leverage, Dividend Payout, and Ownership Concentration Influence Firms' Value Creation? An Analysis of Brazilian Firms (2010, background): “The market value of the firm is defined as the sum of the equity market value plus the debt book value, as is common in current research (Maury and Pajuste 2005; Villalonga and Amit 2006).”
Ownership structure, control contestability, and corporate debt maturity (2015, methodology): “Following previous studies on the governance role of MLS (Attig et al., 2008, 2009; Cai et al., 2015; Laeven and Levine, 2008; Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Mishra, 2011, among others), we consider different MLS-related variables to proxy for…”
International Evidence on Cash Holdings and Expected Managerial Agency Problems (2007, neutral): “6 This more stringent measure takes into account the Maury and Pajuste (2005) findings that multiple large shareholders can influence firm value as well as the idea that managers need more than a token level of control rights before they can, in effect, fully control a firm.”
Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, neutral): “Since block size determines intervention incentives, Winton (1993), Noe (2002), and Edmans and Manso (2011) show that the number of blockholders affects the strength of voice by impacting block size.”
The governance role of multiple large shareholders: evidence from the valuation of cash holdings (2011, neutral): “*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively (2008, 2009), Laeven and Levine (2008), and Maury and Pajuste (2005) and support the argument that the presence of MLS with an even distribution of voting power or cash flow rights is associated with a valuable…”
Family control and investment–cash flow sensitivity: Empirical evidence from the Euro zone (2011, neutral): “21 (Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Jara-Bertin, López-Iturriaga and López-de-Foronda, 2008).”
Corporate Ownership Structure and the Choice Between Bank Debt and Public Debt (2013, neutral): “Having other large owners and strong shareholder rights reduces the 6 tunneling incentives of the controlling shareholder (e.g., Maury and Pajuste, 2005; La Porta et al., 1998; Djankov et al., 2008).”
Family Involvement and Agency Cost Control Mechanisms in Family Small and Medium‐Sized Enterprises (2015, background): “Most studies argue that family involvement at different levels (FIO, FIG, and FIM) can improve firm performance (Maury and Pajuste 2005; Villalonga and Amit 2006; Wang 2006).”