Tax morale and direct democracy
By Benno Torgler. 2005
369 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e643844edb1ee57201df1f316c7f8e8ccdcd95b0
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- James Alm
- Benno Torgler
- S. Mocetti
- Guglielmo Barone
- E. Kirchler
- A. Macintyre
- Bruno S. Frey
- Eliana Viviano
In Economics and Econometrics
- James Alm
- E. Kirchler
- S. Mocetti
- Guglielmo Barone
- Benno Torgler
- J. Martínez-Vázquez
- S. Gaechter
- Eliana Viviano
In Political Science and International Relations
- S. Mocetti
- Guglielmo Barone
- Benno Torgler
- Antonio Filippin
- C. Fiorio
- Eliana Viviano
- S. Gaechter
- E. Kirchler
Citations in the corpus
- The economic effects of direct democracy—a first global assessment (2009, background): “On the basis of individual survey responses, Torgler (2005) also reaches the conclusion that direct democratic rights raise tax morale.”
- Conditional cooperation: Behavioral regularities from the lab and the field and their policy implications (2006, background): “8 Direct-democratic participation rights may also have a strong effect on tax morale (see, e.g., Feld and Frey 2002; Tyran and Feld 2002; Torgler 2005; Torgler and Schaltegger 2005).”
- Tax Compliance, Tax Morale, and Governance Quality (2007, background): “e.g., Torgler (2005b) , show that deterrence factors are not likely to affect tax morale”
- Tax morale and public spending inefficiency (2011, positive): “Finally, some recent papers combine micro with aggregate data: Feld and Frey (2002) and Torgler (2005a) use Swiss data to show that direct democratic rights have a significantly positive effect on tax morale.”
- Enforced versus voluntary tax compliance: The "slippery slope" framework (2008, background): “Several authors suggest that trust in political leadership and administration will lead to voluntary tax compliance when favorable national norms are established (e.g., Fjeldstad, 2004; Frey, 1992; Pommerehne & Frey, 1992; Torgler, 2005; Tyler, 2001a, 2001b).”
- Trust and power as determinants of tax compliance: Testing the assumptions of the slippery slope framework in Austria, Hungary, Romania and Russia (2013, background): “Various studies report that trust in the government and in governmental institutions positively influences tax morale (Fjeldstad, 2004; Pommerehne & Frey, 1992; Torgler, 2005; Torgler & Schneider, 2004).”
- Tax Effort in Developing Countries and High Income Countries: The Impact of Corruption, Voice and Accountability (2008, background): “Torgler (2005) shows that a higher level of direct democracy in a jurisdiction leads to an increased willingness to pay taxes.”
- The effect of tax enforcement on tax morale (2013, positive): “A combination of microdata on tax morale with aggregate data on contextual factors has been used in Feld and Frey (2002) and Torgler (2005) who examine the relationship between direct democratic rights and tax morale.”
- Do Ethics Matter? Tax Compliance and Morality (2011, background): “Torgler (2005) provides further evidence that the stronger is direct democracy in a jurisdiction the stronger is tax ethics, using within country data from Swiss surveys.”
- Tax Morale and Conditional Cooperation (2006, background): “- 26 -”