Phenomenology as a Form of Empathy

By Matthew Ratcliffe. 2012

138 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Abstract This paper proposes that adopting a “phenomenological stance” enables a distinctive kind of empathy, which is required in order to understand forms of experience that occur in psychiatric illness and elsewhere. For the most part, we interpret other people's experiences against the backdrop of a shared world. Hence our attempts to appreciate interpersonal differences do not call into question a deeper level of commonality. A phenomenological stance involves suspending our habitual acceptance of that world. It thus allows us to contemplate the possibility of structurally different ways of “finding oneself in the world”. Such a stance, I suggest, can be incorporated into an empathetic appreciation of others' experiences, amounting to what we might call “radical empathy”.

Subfields: Clinical Psychology, Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e5e95b7222ac9b50308c82a6b95ac8fd9ef188ee

How researchers see this paper

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In Clinical Psychology

  1. Brett W. Smith
  2. A. Sparkes
  3. Peter Mcilveen

In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology

  1. Brett W. Smith
  2. A. Sparkes
  3. K. Douglas
  4. D. Carless
  5. C. Phoenix
  6. Kerry R. McGannon

In Philosophy

  1. A. Sparkes
  2. Brett W. Smith

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