Phenomenology as a Form of Empathy
By Matthew Ratcliffe. 2012
138 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Abstract This paper proposes that adopting a “phenomenological stance” enables a distinctive kind of empathy, which is required in order to understand forms of experience that occur in psychiatric illness and elsewhere. For the most part, we interpret other people's experiences against the backdrop of a shared world. Hence our attempts to appreciate interpersonal differences do not call into question a deeper level of commonality. A phenomenological stance involves suspending our habitual acceptance of that world. It thus allows us to contemplate the possibility of structurally different ways of “finding oneself in the world”. Such a stance, I suggest, can be incorporated into an empathetic appreciation of others' experiences, amounting to what we might call “radical empathy”.
Subfields: Clinical Psychology, Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Philosophy
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e5e95b7222ac9b50308c82a6b95ac8fd9ef188ee
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In Clinical Psychology
In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
In Philosophy
Citations in the corpus
- Effect of employee empathy on customer satisfaction and loyalty during employee–customer interactions: The mediating role of customer affective commitment and perceived service quality (2018, background): “In the marketing literature, in spite of an emphasis on the applicability of empathy during employee–customer interactions, methodological examinations concerning EE and its outcomes are inadequate (Meneses & Larkin, 2017; Ratcliffe, 2012; Wieseke et al., 2012).”
- Routledge Handbook of Qualitative Research in Sport and Exercise (2018, background): “More recently, Ratcliffe (2012) suggests that the most radical”