Wallet Databases with Observers

By David Chaum, Torben P. Pedersen. 1992

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Citations in the corpus

Riffle (2016, methodology): “We used ElGamal encryption using Curve25519 [11] and Neff’s shuffle [37] with Chaum-Pederson proofs [17] for the verifiable shuffle and decryption.”
Handbook of Applied Cryptography (2018, background): “Chaum and Pedersen [251] provide a digital signature scheme which is a variant of the ElGamal signature mechanism (§11.”
ANONIZE: A Large-Scale Anonymous Survey System (2014, unknown): “Cryptographic voting techniques described in prior work may offer a partial solution to this problem (see e.g., [4], [5], [6], [7], [8]).”
Privacy-Friendly Aggregation for the Smart-Grid (2011, methodology): “We use several existing results to prove statements about discrete logarithms, such as, proofs of knowledge of a discrete logarithm [15] and proofs of knowledge of the equality of elements in different representations [16].”
Civitas: Toward a Secure Voting System (2008, background): “The second is a proof of equality of discrete logarithms due to Chaum and Pedersen [13].”
Modern Cryptography: Theory and Practice (2003, unknown): “Since the work of Diffie and Hellman, numerous finite-fields-based cryptosystems and protocols have been proposed: the ElGamal cryptosystems [102], the Schnorr identification protocol and signature sch me [257], the zero-knowledge undeniable signatures of Chaum, and the zero-knowledge proof protocol”
Dissent in Numbers: Making Strong Anonymity Scale (2012, unknown): “Formal security analysis While Dissent is based on techniques with formal security proofs [14, 15, 44], a full formal analysis of Dissent remains for future work.”
Distributed Measurement with Private Set-Union Cardinality (2017, methodology): “The Schnorr proof [44] provides an efficient sigma protocol for FZKP-DL, and the Chaum-Pedersen protocol [9] provides efficient sigma protocols for FZKP-DLE and FZKP-RR.”
Privacy-preserving smart metering (2011, methodology): “We use several existing results to prove statements about discrete logarithms: proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm [35]; proof of knowledge of the equality of some element in different representations [10]; proof with interval checks [33], range proof [5] and proof of the disjunction or conju”
Efficient Proofs that a Committed Number Lies in an Interval (2000, methodology): “This protocol is derived from proofs of equality of two discrete logarithms from [6, 12, 1], combined with a proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm modulo n [16].”
How to Securely Outsource Cryptographic Computations (2005, background): “Chaum and Pedersen [11] previously introduced “wallets with observers” where a third party, such as a bank, is allowed to install a piece of hardware on a user’s computer.”
Sharing Decryption in the Context of Voting or Lotteries (2000, methodology): “A proof of equality of the discrete logarithm of an element G in the basis g and of another element H in the basis h can be designed using the Chaum and Pedersen protocol [3] in such a way that the order of G does not have to be known.”