Concentrated control, institutions, and banking sector: An international study
By I. Haw, Simon S. M. Ho, Bingbing Hu, Donghui Wu. 2010
154 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e4e7af4eb0874b21d86b68f074e2f4c0e601bcb8
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In Accounting
In Finance
- Wenxuan Hou
- Tzu-Pu Chang
- Michael Firth
- Yizhe Dong
- Lei Sun
- Chao Meng
- Abul Shamsuddin
- Muhammad Safiullah
Citations in the corpus
- Ownership Structure and Risk-Taking: Comparative Evidence from Private and State-Controlled Banks in China (2014, background): “Concentrated ownership has been found to be associated with higher risks (Laeven and Levine, 2009), higher insolvency risk and greater return volatility (Haw et al., 2010).”
- A comprehensive analysis of the effects of risk measures on bank efficiency: Evidence from emerging Asian countries (2011, background): “…Berger et al. (2009) on China, Banker et al. (2010) on South Korea, Laeven (1999) on Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand, Haw et al. (2010) on Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, and Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2010) on the emerging…”
- Bank ownership, regulation and efficiency: Perspectives from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region (2017, unknown): “2.2.3 Ownership and bank efficiency Haw et al. (2010) argue that agency problems can be severe in the banking sector partly because of concentrated shareholding, which leads to connected lending and relationship banking, leading to lower bank efficiency.”
- Bank Income Smoothing, Ownership Concentration and the Regulatory Environment (2014, unknown): “Banks that have more powerful shareholders could display higher levels of bank risk, as confirmed empirically by Laeven and Levine (2009) and Haw et al. (2010). Such banks might then have increased incentives to conceal such higher risk taking by smoothing their income, as compared to banks with a m”