Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture

By H. Peyton Young, Mary A. Burke. 2001

206 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e4d5fb761cc9963e2f1d3beafe84ae631d4ee93f

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In Economics and Econometrics

In Management Science and Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

The Demand for Social Insurance: Does Culture Matter? (2011, unknown): “Young and Burke (2001) discuss cropsharing contract choice in Illinois and show that contracts are Our paper contributes to this literature in three different ways.”
The Incidence of EU Per-Hectare Payments on Farmland Rental Rates: A Spatial Econometric Analysis of German Farm-Level Data (2011, background): “Kirwan (2009) mentions land market literature on custom (Young and Burke, 2001) and on long-term tenant-landlord relationships (Allen and Lueck, 2002, Sotomayer et al., 2000) that both may limit 4 Spatial patterns of rental rates being paid may coincide with spatial patterns of land rents being…”
Can Free Entry Be Inefficient? Fixed Commissions and Social Waste in the Real Estate Industry (2002, background): “Both factors suggest that the elasticity of our measures of rent seeking with respect to the price of housing potentially understates the extent to which higher commissions are dissipated by socially wasteful entry.”
The Incidence of U.S. Agricultural Subsidies on Farmland Rental Rates (2009, background): “contracts (Young and Burke 2001), might limit landlords’ ability to extract rent. Tenant-landlord relationships are typically long term, allowing trust to play a role.(28) Robison, Myers, and Siles (2002) report that farmland sales prices are 6–7 percent lower when there is trust between the buyer a”
Complexity and Empirical Economics (2005, background): “A nice example is Young and Burke (2001) who show how the terms of tenant farmer contracts in Illinois exhibit bunching that is strongly suggestive of social interaction effects.”
Social Influence, Binary Decisions and Collective Dynamics (2008, background): “…empirical phenomena of interest to sociologists, such as variability in crime rates (Glaeser et al. 1996 and Kahan 1997) and economic conventions (Young and Burke 2001), the diffusion of innovations (Valente 1995), ‘bystander inactivity’ (Bicchieri and Fukui 1999; Cialdini 2001), residential…”