Soundcomber: A Stealthy and Context-Aware Sound Trojan for Smartphones

By Roman Schlegel, Kehuan Zhang, Xiao-yong Zhou, Mehool Intwala, Apu Kapadia, Xiaofeng Wang. Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, 2011

463 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e4be50e425ebb0c6c8fa40319c31ed99842828d6

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Citations in the corpus

(sp)iPhone: decoding vibrations from nearby keyboards using mobile phone accelerometers (2011, background): “, camera, microphone, GPS) through which a malicious program could potentially eavesdrop upon a target [32, 38].”
Systematic Detection of Capability Leaks in Stock Android Smartphones (2012, background): “Meanwhile, note that some Android malware such as Soundcomber [31] were developed by requesting certain Android permissions.”
Hidden Voice Commands (2016, unknown): “[36] show that malicious apps can eavesdrop and record phone calls to extract sensitive information.”
Unsafe exposure analysis of mobile in-app advertisements (2012, methodology): “, collusion [26], re-delegation [18, 20], or indirect channels [31]) that could avoid using dangerous Android APIs being modeled by AdRisk while still accessing various personal information on the”
AccelPrint: Imperfections of Accelerometers Make Smartphones Trackable (2014, background): “[59] demonstrated that a smartphone’s microphone can be used maliciously to retrieve sensitive data.”
ACCessory: password inference using accelerometers on smartphones (2012, background): “The security risks posed by microphones and cameras have been well documented [18, 21].”
A Survey on Security for Mobile Devices (2013, background): “Soundminer [93] is a proof-of-concept Trojan targeting Android devices that is able to extract private data from”
TaintDroid (2010, background): “, volume control [Schlegel et al. 2011]) indirectly transfer sensitive information.”
ARMageddon: Cache Attacks on Mobile Devices (2015, unknown): “ct+Reload, cross-core 13618 3.79% Ours (OnePlus One) Evict+Reload, cross-core 12537 5.00% Marforio et al. [37] Type of Intents 4300 – Marforio et al. [37] UNIX socket discovery 2600 – Schlegel et al. [49] File locks 685 – Schlegel et al. [49] Volume settings 150 – Schlegel et al. [49] Vibration sett”
Towards Taming Privilege-Escalation Attacks on Android (2012, methodology): “Android's security framework (enforcing sandboxing and permission checks) is not sufficient for transitive policy enforcement allowing privilege escalation attacks as shown by the recent attacks [16] [12] [20] [35].”
DolphinAttack: Inaudible Voice Commands (2017, background): “[44] designed a Trojan that can extract high-value data from audio sensors of smartphones.”
XManDroid: A New Android Evolution to Mitigate Privilege Escalation Attacks (2011, methodology): “• To show the effectiveness of our framework, we implemented and applied a malware test suite that simulates the known application-level privilege escalation attacks [13, 8, 26, 37].”
Collaborative Security (2015, background): “These are examples of explicit privacy, which is mentioned by many in the literature [Barkan et al. 2003; Schmidt et al. 2009; Enck et al. 2010; Reed et al. 2010; Schlegel et al. 2011; Arapinis et al. 2012; Grace et al. 2012].”
Uranine: Real-time Privacy Leakage Monitoring without System Modification for Android (2015, background): “Finally, researchers have developed proof-of-concept malware utilizing side channels that cannot be detected by a traditional information-flow analysis such as ours [29].”