Consequences of Bank Distress During the Great Depression

By C. Calomiris, Joseph R. Mason. 2003

418 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e267dbcf172bf79965907edba945ec9e44151cab

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Citations in the corpus

Opaque banks, price discovery, and financial instability (2012, neutral): “Disruptions in the supply of credit turn a financial crisis into an economic crisis (Bernanke, 1983; Calomiris and Mason, 2003; Flannery, 1998).”
When the Cat's Away the Mice will Play: Does Regulation at Home Affect Bank Risk Taking Abroad? (2013, neutral): “One of the prime targets of such regulation are commercial banks because their risk taking behavior has important implications for financial and economic fragility (Bernanke, 1983; Calomiris and Mason, 1997, 2003a,b).”
Understanding Bank Runs: The Importance of Depositor-Bank Relationships and Networks (2012, methodology): “To make sure that the algorithm we use to compute daily balances is correct, we compare the balance that we obtain at the end of the month using our algorithm with the monthly closing balance for each account provided by the bank.”
Bank Capital and Financial Stability: An Economic Trade-Off or a Faustian Bargain? (2014, background): “On the issue of capital levels, empirical evidence suggests that banks with higher capital have a higher probability of surviving a financial crisis (see Berger & Bouwman 2013) and also gain a competitive edge in deposit and loan markets (see, e.g., Calomiris & Mason 2003).”
Fundamentals, Panics and Bank Distress During the Depression (2003, neutral): “Calomiris and Mason (2003a, 2003b) address the question of the dynamic relationship among bank failures, business failures, and building permits at the state level.”
How Does Capital Affect Bank Performance During Financial Crises (2013, neutral): “We thank two anonymous referees, Franklin Allen, Nittai Bergman, erty, Mark Flannery, Xavier Freixas, Paolo Fulghieri, Robert Marquez, Bob Samolyk, Asani Sarkar, Anjan Thakor, James Thomson, Greg Udell, Todd tion meeting, the Bank for International Settlements, the University of de Recerca en Econom”
Are Banks Really Special? New Evidence from the FDIC-induced Failure of Healthy Banks # (2005, neutral): “…that failed bank deposits have marginal explanatory power over and above monetary aggregates in explaining industrial production.1 More recently, Calomiris and Mason (2003) use an instrumental variables strategy with panel data in order to identify loan supply shocks and their effect on local…”