The evolution of altruistic punishment
By Robert Boyd, Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Peter J. Richerson. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2003
1,641 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e1cb5b49698f6bc5b74baef9bed662db0f42b864
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
- Joseph Henrich
- Ernst Fehr
- Mark Schaller
- Urs Fischbacher
- C. Schaik
- Michael Gurven
- Peter M. Kappeler
- John T. Cacioppo
In Safety Research
- Joseph Henrich
- Ernst Fehr
- Urs Fischbacher
- Herbert Gintis
- Peter M. Kappeler
- Samuel Bowles
- C. Schaik
- Pat Barclay
In Sociology and Political Science
- Joseph Henrich
- Ernst Fehr
- Mark Schaller
- Pat Barclay
- Urs Fischbacher
- Michael Gurven
- C. Schaik
- Herbert Gintis
Citations in the corpus
- Charitable Giving as a Signal of Trustworthiness: Disentangling the Signaling Benefits of Altruistic Acts (2013, background): “…address: wojtek.przepiorka@sociology.ox.ac.u 1090-5138/$ – see front matter © 2013 Elsevier Inc. Al http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2012.11.005 a b s t r a c t a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Initial receipt 21 July 2011 Final revision received 12 November 2012 Keywords:…”
- Third Party Punishment and Social Norms (2004, positive): “This means that differences in group composition can be maintained, rendering group selection empirically more plausible (Bowles, Choi, & Hopfensitz, 2003; Boyd et al. 2003; Henrich & Boyd 2001; Gintis 2001).”
- Beliefs about God, the afterlife and morality support the role of supernatural policing in human cooperation (2011, background): “Whilst the effects we find are not large, we note that cross-cultural differences in the perceived risk of being punished that give rise to even a small increase in the likelihood of individuals behaving prosocially can nonetheless dramatically affect the long-term stability of cooperation in groups”
- Measuring Indirect Reciprocity: Whose Back Do We Scratch? (2009, background): “Fehr and Gachter (2002), Boyd et al. (2003), Carpenter and Matthews (2004), Brandt et al.”
- Tribal Social Instincts and the Cultural Evolution of Institutions to Solve Collective Action Problems (2012, positive): “…of defecting strategies, prosocial norms can still often spread in structured populations with inter-group competition because such mechanisms tilt the balance of within vs. between group evolutionary forces in favor of prosocial norms (Boyd et al. 2003; Guzman et al. 2007; Boyd et al. 2011).”
- Cooperation Emergence under Resource-Constrained Peer Punishment (2016, background): “Social norms offer a means to provide distributed mechanisms for the self-regulation of virtual systems and societies, by delegating to the population itself the responsibility to impose appropriate behavioural standards [6, 28].”
- The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation (2005, methodology): “Those who favor group selection as an important force guiding human behavior must address the daunting pre-requisites regarding within-group stability, among-group variation, migration, extinction, and countervailing action of within-group selection for self-interest (Wilson/Sober 1994).”
- Global Evidence on Economic Preferences* (2018, neutral): “Research in anthropology and behavioral economics has lead to the hypothesis that sanctioning of inefficient behaviors, driven by negative reciprocity, may help sustain large scale cooperation and hence generate efficient outcomes (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Boyd et al., 2003; Henrich et al., 2006).”
- Experimental manipulation of helping in a cooperative breeder: helpers ‘pay to stay’ by pre-emptive appeasement (2005, background): “As punishment presumably involves costs for both the actor and the receiver (functionally it is defined as inflicting costs on the punished at one’s own expense (Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995, page 209), pre-emptive helping would eventually reduce these costs for both parties (Boyd et al. 2003).”
- Evolved Disease-Avoidance Mechanisms and Contemporary Xenophobic Attitudes (2004, background): “Just as specific psychological reactions (such as disgust) may be associated with the perceived threat of disease, other reactions (such as contempt and moral disapproval) may be associated with the perception of norm violation ( Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, & Richerson, 2003; Neuberg & Cottrell, 2002).”
- Can War Foster Cooperation? (2016, positive): “…that our species’ long history of 25 intergroup competition may have favored adaptive psychological responses that promote the success of an individual’s group relative to other groups – especially relative to antagonistic outgroups (see Alexander 1987; Boyd et al. 2003; Darwin 1981; Henrich 2004).”