Program equilibrium
By Moshe Tennenholtz. 2004
123 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
- Alexander Mackay
- Stuart J. Russell
- Benja Fallenstein
- Max Tegmark
- Mihály Bárász
- Patrick LaVictoire
- Eliezer Yudkowsky
- Andrew Critch
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Andrew Critch
- Alexander Mackay
- Stuart J. Russell
- Benja Fallenstein
- Max Tegmark
- Mihály Bárász
- Patrick LaVictoire
- Eliezer Yudkowsky
Citations in the corpus
- Research Priorities for Robust and Beneficial Artificial Intelligence (2015, background): “…account correlations between AI systems’ behaviors and those of their environments or of other agents [60–64], how agents that are embedded in their environments should reason [65, 66], and how to reason about uncertainty over logical consequences of beliefs or other deterministic computations…”
- Program Equilibrium in the Prisoner ’ s Dilemma via Löb ’ s Theorem (2014, methodology): “Howard (1988), McAfee (1984) and Tennenholtz (2004) introduced functionally equivalent agent schemas, which we’ve taken to calling CliqueBot; these agents use quining to recognize self-copies and mutually cooperate, while defecting against any other agent.”
- Parametric Bounded Löb's Theorem and Robust Cooperation of Bounded Agents (2016, methodology): “Previous examples of cooperative program equilibria studied by [1] and [2] all involved cooperation based on equality of programs, a very fragile condition.”
- Robust Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma: Program Equilibrium via Provability Logic (2014, unknown): “In particular, our “agents” will be formulas in Peano Arithmetic, and our criterion for action will be the existence of a finite proof in the tower of formal systems PA+n, where PA is Peano Arithmetic, and PA+(n+1) is the formal system whose axioms are the axioms of PA+n, plus the axiom that PA+n…”
- Competition in Pricing Algorithms (2020, background): “A related strand of literature deals with one-shot games where players choose contracts (or commitment devices) that condition their actions on the strategies of the other players (Tennenholtz, 2004; Kalai et al., 2010; Peters and Szentes, 2012).”